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A work of fine art is not a replaceable commodity that can
be duplicated. It is a one of a kind creation expressing the
spirit and mood of the time of its conception and the
psychological characteristics of the mind that conceives it.
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not even by the artist who conceived it. Because of its very
nature, a work of fine art is a precious expression of the
heart and mind of the artist and should be protected.'
In 1958, a black-and-white mobile designed by the internationally
renowned artist, Alexander Calder, was donated for display at the
Pittsburgh Airport. 2 The Department of Aviation secured the work
in place, painted it green and gold, and motorized it. 3 Although the
Department of Aviation had destroyed Calder's creation, the artist
had no remedy because American law did not yet recognize moral
rights which preserve the intimate bond created between artists and
4
their work.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to promote the Arts by providing artists5 with exclusive rights to their
original works.6 Congress enforces these rights through the Copyright
Act of 1976. 7 However, the Copyright Act primarily protects the art-

1. The Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986: Hearingon S. 2796 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
12-13 (1986), reprintedin F. FELDMAN, S. WEIL & S. DUKE BIEDERMAN, ART LAW RIGHTS
AND LIABILITIES OF CREATORS AND COLLECTORS § 5.3.1, at 136 (Supp. 1988) (statement of

Alfred Crimi, artist and member of the National Society of Mural Painters, selected in 1937 to
design and execute a mural placed on the rear chancel wall of the Rutgers Presbyterian Church
edifice). For a description of the events surrounding Crimi's mural in the Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, see infra text accompanying notes 169-79.
2. See F. CONNER, P.
LEGAL GUIDE 45 (1988).

KARLEN, J.

PERWIN & D.

SPLATT, THE ARTIST's FRIENDLY

3. Id.
4. Id. Currently, artists in the United States are still unprotected. See infratext accompanying notes 97-102.
5. The term "artist" in this note refers to creators of original art. This original art primarily
includes unique paintings, sculptures, drawings, photographs, literary works, motion pictures
or dramatic works. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (referring to artists through the all
encompassing term "Authors").
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). Congress has outlined
artists' exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (stating that the copyright owner has
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, and display for original literary, musical,
dramatic, pantomime, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, motion picture, audiovisual,
or sound recorded works).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (stating that copyrightable works are "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression"); Note, Fine Art: Protection of Artists
and Art, 1 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 99, 100 (1984) (authored by Cordia A. Strom) (discussing the

two requirements for determining originality under the 1976 Copyright Act).
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ist's economic, not personal, rights. 8 Hence, while it is generally ac-

cepted that visual artists retain the right to exploit the economic value
of their creations, the American legal system traditionally has rejected
artists' claims of personal rights in their work after the work is sold. 9

The most popular term identifying these personal rights is the
French term droitmoral, 1° translated as "moral rights."" Moral rights
encompass a variety of rights including the right to create, the right
of disclosure, 3 the right to withdraw, 4 the right to claim authorship, 5

and the right to preserve the work from any alterations, mutilations,
or modifications. 16 France, the first country to legally recognize these

8. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1 F.
FELDMAN, S. WEIL & S. DUKE BIEDERMAN, ART LAW RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
CREATORS AND COLLECTORS § 5.2.1, at 471-72 (1986) (arguing that United States copyright
law protects authors' economic, not personal, rights); see also Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that United States copyright law does not recognize
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, because the law seeks to vindicate
the economic, rather than the personal rights of authors). For a further discussion of the
protection the Copyright Act affords, see infra text accompanying notes 97-130.
9.

Cf. L. PINKERTON & J. GUARDALABENE, THE ART LAW PRIMER:

A

MANUAL FOR

74 (1988) (discussing that in the United States art is personal property vesting
in its purchaser the right to do with the object as the purchaser wishes).
10. For the purpose of this note, the terms droit moral, moral rights, and personal rights
are used interchangeably.
11. See, e.g., Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in California:A CriticalAppraisal,
15 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 29, 29 (1981).
VISUAL ARTISTS

12.

See L. DUBOFF, THE DESKBOOK

OF

ART LAW 798 (1977) (stating that the moral right

doctrine protects authors' right to independently judge whether they will create or refrain from
creating a work); infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
13. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 451 (observing that the right of disclosure gives artists
an absolute right to decide when the public may view the work); infra text accompanying notes
56-65; see also Treece, American Law Analogues of the Authors "Moral Right," 16 A M. J.
Comp. L. 487 (1968), reprinted in F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY,

PRACTICE 53, 54 (1974) (during the period of creation, moral rights give the author the right
to determine when their work has been realized).
14. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 456 (discussing that the moral right to withdraw allows
an artist to request that a transferred work be returned to the artist so it may be modified or
withdrawn from publication); see also L. DuBOFF, supranote 12, at 802 (stating that the right
to decide whether or not to communicate the work to the public is related to the right to
withdraw); infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
15. See T. CRAWFORD, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE VISUAL ARTIST 31-32 (1977) (stating that
the authorship right safeguards artists' right to be recognized as creators); DaSilva, supra note
8, at 459 (observing that the right to exclusive credit for work is included among protected
moral rights); infra text accompanying notes 71-76.
16. See T. CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 32 (stating that a change that misrepresents the
art violates the artist's right of integrity); L. DuBOFF, supra note 12, at 802-03 (stating that
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rights, remains their foremost exponent. 17 In the sixty-three countries
where moral rights exist,,s the work of art is acknowledged as being
a statement of the artist's personality. 19 Therefore, the rights are
premised on a social attitude that the artist's personality must be
2
protected 2° along with the integrity of the creative works. '
On June 16, 1989,2 Senator Edward M. Kennedy introduced legislation to amend the United States copyright laws.- These amendments
included a provision protecting an artist's right to claim authorship
and the right to preserve works of visual art from any alterations,
mutilations, or modifications.2 The bill was introduced to serve three
paramount goals: (1) protect the reputation of visual artists, (2) protect
works of art themselves, and (3) provide a uniform national standard
for these protections.2 The bill mirrors similar legislation that was
introduced in the House of Representatives in 1977.2
On September 27, 1990, after Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier introduced the House counterpart- to Senator Kennedy's bill,2

artists' right of integrity has been recognized since 1890); Treece, supra note 13, at 60-64
(comparing and contrasting French and United States law protecting artists' works from alteration or mutilation); infra text accompanying notes 77-91.
17. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 439.40.
18. Id. at 439 (observing that the rights are recognized in 63 countries and codified in the
Berne International Copyright Convention); see also Comment, An Artist's Personal Rights in
His Creative Works: Beyond the Human Cannonball and the Flying Circus, 9 PAC. L.J. 855,
859 (1978) (authored by James R. Kirby, III) ("The moral right doctrine is followed in sixty-three
countries but has not been recognized in the United States.") (citations omitted).
19. See L. DuBOFF, supra note 12, at 797; Petrovich, supra note 11, at 32; Sarraute,
Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 Am. J.
COMP. L. 465 (1968); infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
20. See L. PINKERTON & J. GUARDALABENE, supra note 9, at 73.
21. Id.
22. Bills Introduced and Senate Hearing Held on Visual Artist's [sic] Moral Rights, 38
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 936, at 225 (June 22, 1989). The bill was introduced
on the Senate floor on June 16, 1989. However, the bill had been introduced earlier before the
Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks. Id.
23. Id. The bill was to amend the Copyright Act by creating a new § 106A to provide
rights of attribution and integrity to visual artists. House Panel Approves Visual Artists Rights
Bill, 39 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 971, at 368 (Mar. 8, 1990).
24. S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989).
25. 136 CONG. REc. H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
26. H.R. 8661, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 22,733 (1977) (introduced by then
Rep. Robert Drinan (D-Mass.)).
27. H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H8266, 8267-68 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1990). On September 27, 1990, Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) introduced H.R. 5498.
Id.
28. Id. at 8271.
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a number of advocates endorsed the idea of federal legislation protecting visual artists' moral rights.2 This support reflects a growing recognition among political leaders that American law must better protect
artists. As one member of Congress stated, "the United States has
become the financial, political, and intellectual capital of the world.
We also have become the arts capital of the world. With that leading
status comes the responsibility for fostering, protecting and encouraging the arts."' 0
Unfortunately, however, the law as enacted has several drawbacks.
First, the law includes a troubling definition of the works to be protected in that the definition may prove to be too narrow in many
cases.3 1 Additionally, the law contains a waiver provision allowing the
artist to waive the rights granted under the law. 2 This provision
potentially may nullify the law's protection because artists with little
bargaining power will be forced to transfer their rights as a condition
of purchase.s Finally, the law fails to achieve the paramount goal of
protecting the works of art because the rights only endure for a term
consisting of the life of the artistas The integrity of works of art
cannot be adequately safeguarded for future generations if the ability
to enforce the rights provided by the law are so limited.3

29. See, e.g., id. at 8270-72.
30. Id. (statement by Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Mass.).
31. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that artists will have the
right to prevent destruction of a work of "recognized stature" only). Section 101 will be amended
by inserting the following- "A 'work of visual art' is- (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,
.. ; or (2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single
copy.. ., or in a limited edition." S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6811 (daily
ed. June 16, 1989).
32. Id. § 106A(e) (rights granted "may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such
waiver in a written instrument signed by the author").
33. In the 1970s, real earnings of artists declined 37%. In 1979, the median annual earnings
of painters, sculptures and craft artists was only $8,576.00. Visual Artists Rights Amendment
of 1986: Hearing on S. 2796 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1986) (prepared statement of Jack
Golodner, Director of the Dep't of Professional Employees, AFL-CIO). Therefore, due to artists'
substantially below average financial status, artists are not in a sufficient bargaining position
to refuse signing waiver provisions as a condition of purchase.
34. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991) ("[Visual artists rights] shall endure
for a term consisting of the life of the author."). However, § 106A(d)(2), which governs works
created before the effective date of the Act, but sold after the effective date, states that the
duration is coextensive with § 106 of the Copyright Act, which is the life of the author plus 50
years. Id. § 106A(d)(2).
35. See H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) ("lilt is paramount to the very integrity of our culture that
we preserve the integrity of our art works as expressions of the creativity of the artist.").
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This note will critically analyze the recently enacted Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 which was signed into law by President Bush on
December 1, 1990.36 In section two, this note will explore the development of moral rights in Europe, focusing specifically on the rights
protected in France. In section three, this note will discuss the legal
theories currently used in the United States to protect artists and
will analyze their effectiveness as substitutes for explicit congressional
protection of moral rights. In section four, this note will analyze the
recently enacted federal legislation and will point out its strengths
and weaknesses. Then, this note will propose solutions that would
adequately safeguard visual artists' rights. Finally, in section five,
this note will conclude that, despite the added protection, the legislation still fails to offer an acceptable framework for the protection of
visual artists.

II.

THE MORAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN VISUAL ARTIST

A.

Development of the Droit Moral Doctrine

As early as 1725, important principles defining authors' rights were
being debated in France.3 7 At that time, legal commentators argued
that authors had perpetual property interests in their manuscripts.
Moral rights arose from both the spirit of these arguments and the
philosophy of individualism 39 which accompanied the French Revolution. 40 These moral rights were said to be "emanating from the creative

activity of the author.'

41

36. 41 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1009, at 123 (Dec. 6, 1990) (The bill
ultimately became law as an attachment to an omnibus judicial reform package.).
37. See DaSilva, supra note 8,at 442-43. In 1725, l'avocat d' Hericourt argued that,
A manuscript is the property of the author, and he cannot be deprived of it any
more than he can be deprived of his money, his personal property or his land, for
it is the fruit of his labor and is personal to him, and he should have the liberty
to dispose of it at will.
Id. at 442-43 n.5.
38. Id. at 442.
39. See id. at 443 (stating that individualism developed from the idea that individuals had
certain natural rights arising from being creators); Note, Injecting a Dose of Duty into the
Doctrine of Droit Moral, 74 IOWiA L. REV. 629, 633 (1989) (authored by Laura Lee Van Velzen)
(During and after the French Revolution, French jurists no longer regarded artists' rights as
royal privileges, but as individual rights arising from the act of creation.).
40. DaSilva, supra note 8,at 443.
41. Id. In the two decades prior to the French Revolution, various ordinances in the country
defined the prerogatives of creators, especially editors and publishers. These ordinances indicated
that rights emanated from the author's creative activity. Id.
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In France today, statutory law dictates that an artist "enjoys in
that work, by sole virtue of its creation, a right of incorporeal property,
exclusive and opposable against all." These rights extend to "all
works of the mind, whatever the type, form of expression, artistic
merit, or purpose."' Such rights are personal, perpetual, inalienable,
and unassignable.- They are personal, remaining vested in the original
creator of the work, and perpetual, for future generations to assert
upon the artist's death. Further, the rights are inalienable and unassignable by contract. 45 Therefore, the right of the artist to keep the
work in its original form exists even after the work is transferred or
the artist dies.
B.

Definition of Rights

The personal, perpetual, inalienable, and unassignable characteristics apply to each of the moral rights granted. The specific moral
47
46
rights granted include the right to create, the right of disclosure,
the right to withdraw,4 the right to claim authorship, 49 and the right
to preserve the work from any alterations, mutilations, or modifications. 50 Each of these rights is worthy of discussion as to their particular attributes and protections.
1. The Right to Create
The right to create, or to refrain "from creating, arose from the
5 French courts have long held that compleright to individual liberty.1
tion of a work cannot be judicially mandated.52 The courts' decisions

42. Loi du 11 mars 1957 Sur La Propridtd Littdraire Artistique, [19571 J.O., [1957] B.L.D.
197, art. 1, para. 1 (1957), cited in DaSilva, supra note 8, at 437, 445 nn.15, 82.
43. Id.
44. L. DuBOFF, supra note 12, at 805 (stating that "the moral right is inalienable and
perpetual" to protect the "personality and integrity of the culture," not the economic interest
of the artist) (emphasis in original); DaSilva, supra note 8, at 446-50 (observing that the moral
right is generally considered a personal right, protecting the personality of the artist as well
as his or her work).
45. L. DuBoFF, supra note 12, at 805-06; DaSilva, supra note 8, at 449-50.
46. See supra note 12.
47. See supra note 13.
48. See supra note 14.
49. See supra note 15.
50. See supra note 16.
51. L. DuBOFF, supra note 12, at 798 (the right of the artist "to create, or to refrain from
creating" is his protection of the right to create); see R. DUFFY, ART LAw: REPRESENTING
ARTISTS, DEALERS, AND COLLECTORS 295-96 (1977).

52.

L. DuBoFF, supra note 12, at 798.
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reflect a judicial respect for the artist's right to create in accordance
with his or her personal disposition.- However, if failure to create
results in the breach of an enforceable contract, the artist is liable for
damages, unless the motivation for not creating was lack of inspiration.- Under French law, lack of inspiration is a normal risk of a
contract for creation and French courts will not impose damages for
nonperformance. 55
2.

The Right of Disclosure

The right of disclosure overlaps with the right to create. The droit
de divulgation, or the right of disclosure, arises when the artist releases the work into the public.- The right gives the author complete
authority over decisions related to the public display, publication, sale,
introduction, or exhibition of the work in any proposed manner. 57 The
right of disclosure presupposes that only the artist knows when a
work is completed and that public disclosure before that point may
adversely affect the artist's reputation.5 The right further assumes
that the artist alone is able to determine when the work should be
59
disclosed, put into the public domain, and exploited for profit.
The landmark case of L'Affaire Camoino upheld the artist's right
of disclosure at the expense of another party's property right in the
work. 61 In Camoin, an artist, dissatisfied with his final product, cut
up and discarded several painted canvasses. 62 An individual found the
3
mutilated paintings, reconstructed them, and sold them at an auction.
The Paris Court of Appeals declared that, "although whoever gathers
up the pieces becomes the indisputable owner of them through possession, this ownership is limited to the physical quality of the fragments,

53. See id.at 798-99.
54. Id. at 799.
55. Id.
56. See 1 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 4-4 (1979)
(stating that the right to decide whether or not to disclose a work allows an artist to enjoin
another from publishing an artist's unfinished work (quoting Merryman, The Refrigerator of
Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1028 (1976)); supra note 13.
57. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 451.
58. Id.
59. See id.at 451, 454-55.
60. Carco c. Camoin, Judgment of March 6, 1931, Cours d'appel Paris, [1931] D.P.II 88,
discussed in DaSilva, supra note 8, at 452; L. DuBOFF, supra note 12, at 799.
61. See L. DUBOFF, supra note 12, at 799.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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and does not deprive the painter of the moral right which he always
retains over his work." Thus, the court ordered that the works be
destroyed according to the artist's wishes. 5
3.

The Right to Withdraw

Even after the artist releases the work into the public, an artist
retains the droit de retrait ou de repentir, loosely translated as the

right to withdraw the work from publication or to make modifications
to it . 6 This right allows an artist to request that a work of art which
has been transferred to another party be restored to the artist so that

it may be retouched or destroyed.6 French courts base this right on
a refusal to question the intellectual and moral decisions of an artist s
Thus, the court will not question the artist's motives for exercising

the right to withdraw, holding that it is an absolute and discretionary
right of the artist. s9 However, in light of the practical difficulties
associated with an artist exercising this right, the French courts have

limited its application to instances in which a publishing contract
existed and have required that the artist indemnify the transferee
prior to exercising the right to withdraw.70
4.

The Right to Claim Authorship

After an artist injects his or her creative personality into a work

and makes a decision to release the creation to the public, French law
vests the artist with the right to claim authorship of it.7 The droit a
la paternite, or right of paternity, encompasses several rights including

64. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French
Law, 16 Ami. J. Comp. L. 465, 468 (1968) (quoting Carco c. Camoin, Judgment of March 6,
1931, Cours d'appel Paris, [1931] D.P.II 88).
65. L. DUBOFF, supra note 12, at 799 ("[The artist] is within his rights to oppose any
restoring of the canvas and to demand, if necessary, that it be destroyed.") (quoting Carco c.
Camoin, Judgment of March 6, 1931, Cours d'appel Paris, [1931] D.P.II 88).
66. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 456; supra note 14.
67. See Sarraute, supra note 64, at 476.
68. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 475 n.158.
69. See id.
70. See L. DuBOFF, supra note 12, at 802. Several authors have concluded that the right
to withdraw is limited to situations in which a publishing contract exists. See L. DUBOFF,
supra note 12, at 802; Sarraute, supra note 64, at 477. But see DaSilva, supra note 8, at 457
(concluding that, based on the 1957 law, an author enjoys the right to modify or withdraw
works, without mentioning any limitation with respect to publishing contracts).
71. See T. CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 31-32.
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the right to acknowledge an artist's authorship,7 2 the right to prohibit
false attribution, and the right to prohibit use of the artist's name on
3
works that are not his or her creation.7
The right to claim authorship was first recognized in 1837 when a
Paris court held that "[tihe collaborator whose name has been omitted
without his knowledge from the title of a work may obtain recognition
of his authorship and his rights through the courts." The right is not
intended to protect the artist's reputation so much as to protect the
act of creation itself.- In France today, a court can void a contract
which attempts to negale this right.76
5. The Right of Integrity
Finally, after an artist has completed, published, performed, displayed, sold or transferred a work, the artist retains what virtually
all scholars claim to be the most essential of all moral rights, the droit
au respect de loeuvre, or right of integrity.7 This right enables an
artist to preserve the work from any alterations, mutilations, or modifications to the work. 781 As early as 1874, French courts recognized
the right of integrity when the owner of a work of art altered the
work and then continued to display it in this altered form.7 9 As Professor Merryman stated, "[d]istortion, dismemberment or misrepresentation of the work mistreats an expression of the artist's personality, affects his artistic identity, personality and honor, and thus
'80
impairs a legally protected personality interest.
In 1965, the right of integrity was illustrated vividly in a case
decided by the Cour de cassation, France's highest court., The artist,
Bernard Buffet, had painted six distinct panels on a refrigerator; one
on each side, one on top, and three on the door.8 The refrigerator

72. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 460. The right to acknowledge authorship includes artists'
right to publish under a pseudonym or anonymously. Id.
73. Id.
74. Sarraute, supra note 64, at 478 (citing D. R6pertoire de Jurisprudence V ° Prop. Lit.
et Art. (No. 194)).
75. L. DuBoFF, supra note 12, at 802.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
78. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 464.
79. See id. at 464-65.
80. J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 56, at 4-3.
81. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 465 (discussing Buffet c. Fersing, 1962 D. Jur. 570 (Cour
d'appel Paris), affd 1965 G.P.I] 126 (Cour de cassation)).
82. J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 56, at 4-2.
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was auctioned with several other similarly decorated refrigerators.8
The owner of Buffet's work then dismantled it and proposed to sell
each individual panel as a "painting on metal" by Bernard Buffet. 4
Buffet opposed the sale, claiming that the refrigerator was "an indivisible artistic unit. '" The Cour de cassation affirmed the Cours d'appel
Paris, holding that the sale of the individual panels constituted a
violation of Buffet's right of integrity.8 Thus, treating the panels as
separate and distinct pieces of art distorted and misrepresented Buffet's intentions and the owner was not permitted to dismantle the
refrigerator and dispose of it piece by piece.8
Additionally, artists have successfully invoked the right of integrity
in contexts which do not involve the physical dismantlement or defacement of original works of art. In BernardRousseau v. Soc. des Galeries
Lafayette,8 Henri Rousseau's granddaughter sued to enjoin a Paris
department store from using reproductions of Rousseau's paintings as
window displays.8 The granddaughter claimed the images and colors
were altered and therefore violated the deceased artist's right of integrity.90 The court agreed and held that the touchstone basis for finding
a violation of the right of integrity was damage to the reputation of
the artist. 91
As explained above, moral rights in Europe have provided artists
with an ongoing relationship to the physical object of the work itself.9
Under the European scheme of moral rights, the artist has absolute
sovereignty over the work during the time of its creation.9 Additionally, after the work is released into the public realm, the artist enjoys
rights protecting the bond between the artist and the work.9 Finally,
after the artist's death, the artist's heirs can assert the individual

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Sarraute, supra note 64, at 480.
86. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 465.
87. J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 56, at 4-3 to 4-4.
88. Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 3 ch. (Mar. 13, 1973) (unpublished opinion).
89. DaSilva, supra note 8, at 465.
90.
91.
92.

See J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 56, at 4-25 notes and questions 2.
See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 465.
See L. PINKERTON & J. GUARDALABENE, supra note 9, at 73. These rights are

different from artists' rights under copyright law which protects the property interest in the
artist's work which are distinct from the object itself. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 484.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.

94. See supra text accompanying notes 66-91.
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moral rights granted.,, The European moral rights recognize that artists project part of themselves into each piece of work and the rights
seek to protect this personal interest. 6

III.

CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROTECT ARTISTS IN THE UNITED
STATES

The United States has yet to adopt the comprehensive system of
protection found in Europe. 97 This resistance is based largely on the
historic strength of property rights in our country and on the nbtion
that the law should not prohibit owners of personal property, such as
a work of art, from treating the property as they please. However,
artists in the United States are not entirely without protection." Artists traditionally have relied on remedies available in existing state
and federal schemes.' 0 Although they offer some protection, the application of these remedies has created scant protections because the
remedies are derived from legal theories which are not designed with
visual artists in mind.'o Thus, even the courts which have demonstrated a willingness to provide remedies to artists asserting moral
rights have done so by employing various legal theories. 01 2 Each of
the theories which have provided protection for artists in the United
States will be analyzed below, both in terms of their theoretical purpose and their subsequent treatment by those courts seeking to protect
artists' rights.
A.

Copyright Protection

The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 remains the only significant
national legislation dealing with authors' rights. 0 3 Unfortunately, the
Act primarily recognizes artists' economic interest in their work, not
their personal interest. 10 However, at least one court has augmented
traditional copyright law so that a right analogous to the European
right of integrity falls within its ambit.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 103-84.
See id.
See id.

102. See id.
103. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977) (copyright owner has exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, and display for original works).
104. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 484.
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In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,105 the plaintiffs, members of the British comedy group "Monty Python," sought to prevent
the ABC television network from broadcasting an edited version of
their series.' °6 Monty Python had entered into a contract with the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which gave the BBC the right
to license the transmission of the program.' °7 However, the contract
strictly limited the BBC's power to edit the script prior to recording
by specifying detailed procedures to be followed during the editing

process. 0 8 Moreover, the contract did not allow the BBC to edit the
script after recording it. 1°9
After the show was recorded, the BBC entered into an agreement
with ABC." 0 The agreement allowed ABC to broadcast two ninetyminute specials, each to be comprised of three thirty-minute programs.", However, when ABC broadcast the first special, it had edited

twenty-four minutes in order to remove materials considered offensive

105. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id. at 17 n.2. The agreement provided in pertinent part:
When script alterations are necessary it is the intention of the BBC to make every
effort to inform and to reach agreement with the Writer. Whenever practicable
any necessary alterations (other than minor alterations) shall be made by the
Writer. Nevertheless, the BBC shall at all times have the right to make (a) minor
alterations and (b) such other alterations as in its opinion are necessary in order
to avoid involving the BBC in legal action or bringing the BBC in disrepute ....
It is however agreed that after a script has been accepted by the BBC alterations
will not be made by the BBC under (b) above unless (i) the Writer, if available
when the BBC requires the alterations to be made, has been asked to agree to
them but is not willing to do so and (ii) the Writer has had, if he so requests and
if the BBC agrees that time permits if rehearsals and recording are to proceed as
planned, an opportunity to be represented by the Writers' Guild of Great Britain
... at a meeting with the BBC to be held within at most 48 hours of the request
....
Apart from the right to make alterations under (a) and (b) above the BBC
shall not without the consent of the Writer or his agent.., make any structural
alterations as opposed to minor alterations to the script, provided that such consent
shall not be necessary in any case where the Writer is for any reason not immediately available for consultation at the time which in the BBC's opinion is the
deadline from the production point of view for such alterations to be made if
rehearsals and recording are to proceed as planned.
Id.
108. Id. at 17.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111.

Id. at 18.
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or obscene and to make time for commercials. 112 Following this broadcast, Monty Python sought an injunction preventing ABC from broadcasting the second special.113
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed the airing of
the second special.114 Despite a finding of irreparable injury to Monty
Python's theatrical reputation, the court simply required ABC to
broadcast a statement at the outset of the second special that the
show had been edited by ABC.1 15 Six months later,116 relying on federal

copyright law,1 7 the Gilliam court ruled in favor of Monty Python
and ordered the district court to issue a preliminary injunction blocking
future airings of the special.1s The court held that Monty Python had
an independent copyright in the script and the license granted to the
BBC by Monty Python limited the BBC's use of the work. 119 Moreover,
the court noted that the contract between Monty Python and the BBC
specifically disallowed the BBC from editing the programs once recorded. 120 Because the BBC did not have the authority to edit, the
court concluded that the BBC could not convey greater rights then
they possessed.12 , Therefore, any transfer of a right to edit by the
BBC to ABC was "a nullity."'The Gilliam court reinforced the principle that the primary focus
of United States copyright laws is to enable copyright holders to
control their work. 12 The court noted that "copyright law should be
used to recognize the important role of the artist in our society and
the need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic works
by providing adequate legal protection for one who submits his work
to the public."''
The decision in Gilliam might be hailed as a victory for the artist
asserting moral rights through the federal copyright laws. However,
the Gilliam decision stands for something less than full recognition of

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

19-20.
26.
19-20.
21.

at 23.
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moral lights in the United States. A critical factor in the Gilliam
court's copyright holding was that Monty Python retained the
copyright of the underlying script and therefore was within its rights
in objecting to any copyright infringement.1-

However, if Monty

Python had transferred the copyright to the BBC, the BBC could
have permitted ABC to broadcast the edited version. 126 Unfortunately,
in most situations, the scriptwriter does not retain the copyright, and
the person for whom the work was prepared gains full copyright
control.'

Additionally, the Gilliam court noted that the agreement between
Monty Python and the BBC clearly stated that the BBC had no right
to edit the program after recording. m Thus, the BBC exceeded the
scope of its license by granting ABC greater rights than the BBC
owned.m The Gilliam court did not indicate whether it would have
recognized Monty Python's claim in the absence of the limiting language in the contract.
Thus, the Gilliam decision is limited in scope and applicable in
only those narrow circumstances where artists retain a copyright in
their work and possess a clear contract. Neither the Gilliam decision
specifically, nor the federal copyright laws in general, provide significant protection to visual artists who have sold their physical work
and its copyright, and still wish to prevent its mutilation or destruction.130 Because of the limited protection of federal copyright laws,
they are a poor substitute for explicit recognition of an artist's right
of integrity.
B. Protection Under the Lanham Act
In addition to seeking protection under federal copyright laws,
artists have relied on section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act 3'

125. Id. at 19.
126. See id. (The court agreed with the contention that "ownership [of the copyright] is irrelevant because the recorded program was merely a derivative work taken from the script in
which" Monty Python still retained the copyright.).
127. See Treece, supra note 13, at 60 (The Copyright Act provides that the word "author"
includes an employer in the case of works made for hire. This employer/employee arrangement
completely severs the relation between the creator and ownership of the work created. An
employee who creates for hire has no rights to have his or her authorship acknowledged because
the author label shifts automatically through the "work-for-hire" arrangement.).
128. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21.
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 105-29.
131. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982) (codifying § 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark
Act, ch. 540, tit. VIII, 60 Stat. 441 (1946)). The Lanham Act provides in pertinent part:
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to protect their moral rights. Unlike the other sections of the Lanham
Act, section 43(a) does not govern trademarks exclusively.13 Section
43(a) prohibits false representation of commercial goods in order to
achieve two principal aims: (1) to permit manufacturers to differentiate
their goods from those produced by others, and (2) to protect consumers from misleading designations of a product's source. - The purpose
of section 43(a) is analogous to the European right of paternity, which
provides the artist with the right to claim authorship; and with the
European right of integrity, which provides the artist with the right
to preserve the work from any alterations, modifications, or mutila-

tions. 135
The seminal case successfully asserting the right of paternity under
the guise of section 43(a) is Smith v. Montoro.136 In Smith, the plaintiff
sought damages to his reputation from a film distributor who removed
the plaintiffs name from the credits and substituted the name of
another actor. 137 The plaintiff claimed that the alleged acts constituted
the economic equivalent of a trademark or tradename violation.'3 The
court of appeals agreed and reversed the district court's order dismissing the complaint. 139 The Smith court reasoned that "actors' fees for
pictures, and indeed their ability to get any work at all, is often based
on the drawing power their name may be expected to have at the box
office, [therefore] being accurately credited for films. . .[is] of critical
importance in enabling actors to sell their 'services.' ' 140 Therefore,
because the film distributor did not credit the plaintiff for his part in
the film, the plaintiff would not be able to use the film to his advantage

Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation . . . and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ... shall
be liable ... by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by
the use of any such false description or representation.

Id.
132. See infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
133. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982) (governing false designation of origin in a
general commercial sense, not just false descriptions of trademarks).
134. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th
Cir. 1980).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 71-96.
136. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
137. Id. at 603. Plaintiff was an actor named Paul Smith who appeared in the film "Convoy
Buddies but whose name in the credits was replaced with the name Bob Spencer." Id.
138. Id. at 604-07.
139. Id. at 608.
140. Id. at 607.
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when seeking future roles. This reasoning suggests that artists whose
work has not been attributed to them might have a claim under section
43(a) roughly paralleling the right of paternity which vests the artist
with the right to claim authorship.' 4 '
Similarly, the Gilliam court invoked section 43(a) to recognize a
right analogous to the European right of integrity.'4 The Second Circuit held that Monty Python, in addition to its copyright claim, had
a legitimate claim under section 43(a).'" The court held that ABC's
presentation to the public of a distorted version of the group's work
was in fact a false representation prohibited by the Lanham Act.'"
The court noted that 'the truncated version at times omitted the
climax of the skits to which appellants' rare brand of humor was
leading and at other times deleted essential elements in the schematic
development of the story line... [and] therefore impaired the integrity
of appellants' work.' 145 Consequently, even though section 43(a) traditionally was invoked to remedy misleading representations as to a
good's origin, the Gilliam court found that ABC's distorted version
of Monty Python's work was a misleading representation, violative of
section 43(a). 46 The court's reasoning suggests that an artist whose
work has been greatly distorted might have a claim under section
43(a) analogous to the right of integrity which vests the artist with
the right to prevent alterations, mutilations, or modifications.
The Smith and Gilliam interpretations of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, though seemingly promising, may not offer much assistance to visual artists. Although the reasoning of Smith suggests that
when a work is not properly attributed to an artist, the artist might
have a valid claim,147 the prevailing view of American courts is that
an artist does not have the right to be identified as the creator of a
work unless the artist has secured this right by contract. 14 Moreover,
courts may be inclined to limit the holding in Smith to situations
where the artist's name is replaced with that of somebody else.'4
There is no clear indication that the Smith court would have recognized
a right analogous to the moral right of paternity if the artist's name
had simply been omitted instead of replaced.
141.

Id.

142.

Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.

143. Id. at 24-25.
144. Id. at 25.
145. Id.
146.

Id.

147. See Treece, supra note 13, at 64.
148. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Finally, like the right of paternity in Smith, the Gilliam case
similarly illustrates the limitations on the protection of the right of
integrity afforded by section 43(a). Artists can only invoke the Lanham
Act when work has been distorted and subsequently misrepresented
as that of the original artists' product. 150 Conceivably, ABC could have
prevailed in the Gilliam case by simply broadcasting the special without ever attributing the show to Monty Python. Moreover, the Gilliam
court explicitly acknowledged that moral rights are not recognized in
this country.' 5' Based upon such language, the Lanham Act is too
shaky a foundation upon which to build a permanent structure of
artists' rights. 152
C.

Contractually Created Rights

In view of the inherent limitations associated with employing the
Copyright Act or the Lanham Trademark Act for protection, many
artists are compelled to rely on contractual provisions to protect their
moral rights.- However, due to the poor financial status of many
artists, they usually are not in a position to negotiate for the protections that moral rights legislation could provide.'5 Struggling artists
primarily are motivated by selling their work to receive exposure.Thus, the struggling artists are forced to accept the standard form
contracts with which they are often faced for fear that the purchaser
will go elsewhere.156 The standard form contracts usually grant the
purchaser all rights in the work.157 Once bound by these contracts,
artists cannot assert any of the moral rights recognized in European
countries. -,
One case demonstrating an artist bound by such contract provisions
is Vargas v. Esquire, Jnc.159 In Vargas, the plaintiff, artist Alberto

150. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
151. Id.
152. See DaSilva, supra note 8, at 481 (observing that the Gilliam decision was based more
on the Copyright Act than the Lanham Act, and the fact that the contract between the artists
and the BBC strictly prohibited unauthorized editing of scripts).
153. See T. CRAWFORD, supra note 15, at 39.
154. See supra note 33.
155. See Goetzl & Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right: A New Doctrinal
Analysis, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 15, 39-40 (1984).

156.

See id.

157.

See id. at 40.

158.

Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813

(1948).
159.

Id. at 522.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/4

18

Schneider: Recently Enacted Federal Legislation Providing Moral Rights to Vi
LEGISLATION PROVIDING MORAL RIGHTS TO VISUAL ARTISTS

Vargas, contracted with Esquire Magazine to produce drawings of
women for the magazine.'r For six years, the drawings were reproduced and published bearing the title "the Varga Girl.' 161 Upon cancellation of the contract, Esquire possessed twenty drawings which the
magazine had not yet published.' Thereafter, Esquirepublished these
drawings under the new title "The Esquire Girl" instead of the traditional title of the "The Varga Girl."' Vargas brought suit seeking to
enjoin further reproduction of his pictures, and alleging that the publication constituted a misrepresentation of authorship because the title
no longer ascribed authorship to Vargas.'6
Relying on the contract between Vargas and Esquire, the court
held that the contract had divested the plaintiff "of all title, claim and
interest in such drawings and designs."'r Moreover, the court similarly
dismissed Vargas' claim that he had a right to claim authorship in
order to protect his reputation.'r The court reasoned that 'moral
rights' of authors . . . [have] not yet received acceptance in the law
of the United States .... What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change
in the law of this country... [and] we are not disposed to make any
new law in this respect."1' Therefore, despite Vargas' world wide
reputation as being the artist of the drawings, the court permitted
Esquire Magazine to publish the remainder of the drawings without
attributing authorship to Vargas.'6
Another case in which an artist was bound by a rigid standard
form contract is Crimi v. Rutgers PresbyterianChurch. 69 In Crimi,
the New York Supreme Court, relying on a contract, refused to pre0 The plaintiff, Alfred Crimi,17 1 won
vent the destruction of a muraly7
a competition to design a fresco mural on the wall of the defendant
church.1 2 Crimi's sketches were unanimously approved by a church
committee, and he subsequently completed the twenty-six foot by

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id.
Id.

165. Id. at 526.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting, in part, S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 802 (1938)).
168. Id. at 527.
169. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949).
170. Id. at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
171. See supra text accompanying note 1.

172. Crimi, 194 Misc. at 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
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thirty-five foot work.17- Upon completion, Crimi signed the mural.' 74
Eight years later, however, the church painted over the mural and
barred Crimi from entering the building. 5
Based upon reasoning reminiscent of Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., the
Crimi court held that there was no legal basis for Crimi's claim of
restoration or damages because all rights in the work had passed to
the church pursuant to a contract between the parties.1 76 The court
reasoned that absent an express contractual provision, an artist does
not retain any rights in a work after it is sold. 7 7 Moreover, the court
did not agree that destruction of the mural constituted an attack on
Crimi's artistic reputation.7 s Under the Crimi decision, the church
legally could destroy Crimi's creation and Crimi had no legal re-

course.'79
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, American analogues to
the moral right fail to meet the needs of the visual artist.18° By employing various legal theories, some artists have been able to secure limited
protection for what in actuality are their moral rights. 18' As the Vargas
and Crimi cases demonstrate, the judiciary has been reluctant to deal
with any arguments cloaked in moral rights terms."- Artists only have
been successful when they have fit the facts of their particular case
into a framework acceptable by the courts. Thus, those cases which
provide relief for moral rights violations probably are indicative of
creative presentations on the part of the attorneys rather than judicial
acceptance of moral rights. This approach excludes the claims of too
many potential artists and creates "patchwork relief' because of inconsistent verdicts.8- As a result of this inconsistency, artists will then

173. Id.
174. Id. at 571, N.Y.S.2d at 814.
175. Id. at 572, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
176. Id. at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 573-75, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 816-19.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 103-79.
181. See id. See generally Treece, supra note 13 (identifying United States law analogues
to French concepts of moral rights).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 159-79.
183. Compare Smith, 648 F.2d at 607 (finding that film distributor damaged plaintiff actor's
reputation when the distributor removed plaintiffs name from film credits and replaced it with
the name of another actor) and Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21, 24-25 (holding that broadcaster may
violate Copyright Act and violated Lanham Act by broadcasting an unauthorized, significantly
edited version of artist's work) uith Crimi, 194 Misc. at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819 (holding
that artist had no basis for relief because artist had transferred all rights in artwork when
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contemplate forum-shopping among jurisdictions based upon how will-

ing a particular court is to provide relief for moral rights violations.'s
Thus, legislative guidelines are needed to clearly establish the rights
of American visual artists and provide national uniformity.
IV.

RECENTLY ENACTED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

A.

History

In recognition of the need for specific federal legislation on moral
rights, Senator Edward M. Kennedy introduced The Visual Artists

Rights Act of 1989.1s Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives.'6 The
bills were consolidated and passed by Congress on October 27, 1990

as the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.17
The law was enacted to serve three paramount goals: (1) to protect
the honor and reputation of visual artists, (2) to protect works of art
themselves, and (3) to provide a uniform national standard for these
protections.1'sThe law amends the Federal Copyright Act by creating
a new section giving visual artists the right to claim authorship and
the right of integrity. 1' Furthermore, the law preempts state laws,
thereby creating a uniform national scheme for artists' rights.190
Although the law eliminates many of the obstacles that arise when
moral rights are protected through the use of other legal theories,
the law fails to adequately safeguard the visual artist's moral rights.

artist contracted to sell artwork to buyer) and Vargas, 164 F.2d at 526 (holding that artist
could not seek relief for misrepresentation of authorship because artist had transferred all rights
under contract with publisher).
184. See Gantz, ProtectingArtists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the CaliforniaArt Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 873, 901 (1981).
185. S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 185 CONG. REC. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16, 1989).
186. H.R. 5498, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H8266-69 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990).
187. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106A, 113, 301, 411(a), 412, 501(a), 506 (West
Supp. 1991)).
188. See 136 CONG. REc. H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Robert W.
Kastenmier).
189. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a) (West Supp. 1991). The law creates limited rights of
integrity and attribution to visual artists. The law's right of attribution roughly parallels the
European right to claim authorship. See infra text accompanying notes 204-08. The law's right
of integrity, however, parallels the European right of integrity only with respect to alterations,
mutilations, or modifications. With respect to full destruction, the law only recognizes the right
of integrity for works of "recognized stature." 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(3)(B); see also infra text
accompanying notes 206-16 (critiquing Visual Artists Rights Act).
190. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(f)(1)-(2).
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First, the law protects only limited classes of works.1 9 Also, the law
recognizes a much narrower range of moral rights than its European
counterparts. 19 Additionally, the law allows an artist to waive the
rights that the law attempts to provide.'9 Finally, the rights conferred
endure for such a short duration, the works themselves will become
unprotected at some point.'9 Each of these shortcomings will be discussed more fully below.
B.

Characteristicsof the Law
1. Works Protected

As described earlier, French law protecting moral rights covers
"all works of the mind, whatever the type, form of expression, artistic
merit, or purpose."' 195 In contrast, the law recently enacted by Congress strictly limits protection to works of "visual art."1 6 The law
defines "visual art" as paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, or still
photographic images produced for exhibition purposes and existing in
limited editions of two-hundred copies or fewer.'9 Further, the law's
protection of moral rights does not extend to motion pictures and
other audio visual works.198 Drastically limiting the definition of visual
art impedes the spirit of droit moral, because legal protection does
not extend to a broader range of visual arts or other creative efforts.19
The limited breadth of protected works seriously impairs the effectiveness of the law. For example, because the law does not apply to
"motion pictures, '' 2- a case like Gilliam would be unaffected by the
law. 201 Yet, the law purports to create visual artists' rights. 202 Unfor-

191. See id. § 101.
192. See id. § 106A(a). The act protects to some extent only rights of attribution and
integrity. See id.
193. See id. § 106A(e).
194. See id. § 106A(d)(1). The rights conferred under the act will endure only for the life
of the author. Id. However, § 106A(d)(2), which governs works created before the effective
date of the Act, but sold after the effective date, states that the duration is coextensive with
§ 106 of the Copyright Act, which is the life of the author plus 50 years. Id. § 106A(d)(2).
195. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
196. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See supra text accompanying note 43.
200. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 105-30.
202. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a).
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tunately, the lobbying strength of the motion picture industry and
other copyright-intensive industries created a substantial obstacle to
a more expansive moral rights bill.
2. Rights Created
In addition to delineating the works to be protected, the law recognizes a visual artist's right to claim authorship. 2°4 The operative
language granting the right to claim authorship states that,
the author ... shall have the right ... to claim authorship
of that work ... to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create . . . [and] shall have the right to prevent the use of
his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in
the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification
05
of the work. . ...
This language recognizes a right that is roughly equivalent to France's
right to claim authorship.2 The law eliminates the types of problems
faced by the artist in the Smith case because the law expressly recognizes the right to claim authorship.m
In addition to recognizing the visual artist's right to claim authorship, the law recognizes the visual artist's right of integrity. 2°8 However, the language recognizing the right of integrity is not as promising
as the language recognizing the right to claim authorship. Although
the law prevents intentional distortions, mutilations, or modifications
to works of artm the law only prevents full destruction of works of
"recognized stature." 210 Inherent in the requirement that works be of

203. See House Panel Approves Visual Artists Rights Bill, supra note 23 (discussing the
amended version of the House resolution excluding '"motion pictures" which eliminated problems
pointed out in prior Subcommittee hearings). Representative Kastenmeier stated that, as a
result, he "know[s] of no opposition to the bill." Moreover, Representative Carlos Moorhead
(R-Calif.) explained he would support the bill as amended "both for what it does and for what
it does not do." Id.
204. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
205. See id. § 106A(a)(1)-(2).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 136-41, 147-49.
208. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(a)(3).
209. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
210. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). Although the law fails to define what works are of "recognized
stature," the Senate bill delineated factors a court or other trier of fact could consider in
determining whether a work is of "recognized stature." See S.1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
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"recognized stature" is the likelihood that the goals of protecting the
artist and the artworks will be undermined. Some of the drawbacks
associated with the "recognized stature" requirement can be demonstrated in two ways.
First, the requirement that works be of "recognized stature" in
order to gain protection under the law may discourage artists from
vigorously enforcing their rights. This may result from a struggling
artist's fear that a judge or jury will decide that his or her work fails
to meet the standard. A negative verdict could do more damage to
the artist's reputation than the physical destruction of the work itself.
In addition, the enormous expenses associated with litigation may
further deter artists from enforcing their rights. Thus, the "recognized
stature" requirement may frustrate the legislation's goal of protecting
the visual artist's honor and reputation.211
The law's "recognized stature" requirement also will undermine
the goals of protecting the artist and the artwork because of the
difficulty encountered in making the "recognized stature" determination. Triers of fact, be it a judge or jury, are unable to decide on the
merit or legitimacy of every work of art. As Justice Holmes stated
with respect to judges in Bleistein v. DonaldsonLithographingCo.:212
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations. . . . At the one extreme,
some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation....
At the other end, [protection] would be denied to pictures
213
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
By placing the evaluation of artworks in the hands of untrained judges
or juries, the "recognized stature" requirement seems certain to administer injustice and provide inadequate protection to all works of art.
Moreover, in light of the probability that "experts" will be relied
upon in determining whether a work is of "recognized stature," it is
possible that some works of genius will be denied protection.214 History

REc. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16, 1989). The provision stated, in pertinent part: "In
determining whether a work is of recognized stature, a court or other trier of fact may take
into account the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors, . . . curators, .
and other persons
involved with the creation, appreciation, history, or marketing of works.
Id.
211. See supra text accompanying note 25.
212. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
213. Id. at 251-52 (discussing application of copyright protection).
214. See id.; supra note 210 and accompanying text.
CONG.
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is fraught with examples of leaders in the artistic community denying
a new work its proper place in the market. 215 Thus, a court, in relying
on the testimony of established experts, will likely exclude from the
Act's protection new and progressive works of art otherwise worthy
of such protection. The "lay" judiciary will have to become attuned
to the possible biases of established experts.
In spite of the drawbacks associated with the "recognized stature"
requirement, at least one benefit exists. The restrictive nature of the
requirement eliminates frivolous claims, such as an action arising from
someone's destruction of another's doodling. Moreover, the requirement eliminates the possibility of unknown artists seeking to gain
publicity through petty suits. The "recognized stature" requirement
ensures that the law protects only works that society deems important.21 6
3. Transferability and Duration of Rights
In addition to limiting the works protected and the rights created,
the law allows the artist to waive the rights recognized.217 Unlike the
European model which grants perpetual, inalienable and unassignable
rights, the law states that the rights "may be waived if the author
expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument. '' 218 This provision undermines the central purpose of protecting artists and
artworks because the unknown talent who most needs the law's protection also will be most vulnerable to it. Only prominent artists can
resist pressure to waive the rights possessed. 219 Struggling artists
usually cannot.
Struggling artists primarily are motivated by receiving exposure.
Presumably, this is achieved by selling their work. Thus, they must
accept the purchaser's terms for fear that the purchaser will go elsewhere. This fear often will compel the artist to sign a waiver. Prohibiting waivers would enhance the evenhandedness of contractual arrangements because both sides could negotiate freely for their own interests.
Another obstacle to the law's ability to safeguard the visual artists'
rights is the rather short duration of the rights that the law confers.2' 0

215.
216.

See J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 56, at 3-26.
See S. 1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989)

(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
217.
218.
219.
220.

See
See
See
See

17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(e)(1).
id.
supra text accompanying notes 153-58.
17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)(1).
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Although one of the paramount goals of the law is protection of the
art itself, the rights only endure "for a term consisting of the life of
the author."-, This limited duration is significantly different from the
European model where the moral rights granted are perpetual.C.

Proposalsfor Change

The law offers the possibility of a dramatic leap forward in the
legal protection of moral rights for visual artists in the United States.
The law overcomes many of the barriers that arise from the attempt
to protect moral rights through other legal theories not designed with
visual artists in mind.m However, to fully achieve the three paramount
goals of protecting the honor and reputation of visual artists, protecting the works of art themselves, and providing a uniform national
standard for these protections,2 Congress should amend the law in
the following ways.
Congress should broaden the statutory delineation of moral rights
granted2 so that such rights are extended to other works of visual
art. Although expanding the law's coverage might result in frivolous
suits including those involving works society has no interest in protecting, the "recognized stature" requirement unduly excludes far too
many works from protection because of its unpredictable nature. 22
Thus, a balance must be struck which ensures that all forms of genuine
work are protected. One way of achieving this balance is to expand
the "recognized stature" requirement to include more works while
simultaneously delineating a list of "experts" the factfinder may look
to for its determination.2 The list of experts should include art professors and art students. This will assure that the law protects new,
progressive or eccentric forms of art. Furthermore, evidence of the
creator's intent should be a factor in resolving the works legitimacy
because any work intended as a serious artistic effort is socially enhancing. Given the rationale behind moral rights of protecting the integrity
of creative works,m all serious works are worthy of protection.

221. Id. However, § 106A(d)(2), which governs works created before the effective date of
the Act, but sold after the effective date, states that the duration is coextensive with § 106 of
the Copyright Act, which is the life of the author plus 50 years. Id. § 106A(d)(2).
222. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 97-184.
224. See supra text accompanying note 25.
225. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 210-16.
227. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 37-96.
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Additionally, Congress should amend the law so that the rights
granted are nontransferable and perpetual.29 Such an amendment
would enhance the paramount goal of protecting the works of art
themselves, while also assuring that struggling artists are not forced
to waive their statutory rights. Moreover, deeming moral rights to
be inalienable, unassignable, and perpetual recognizes that the integrity of our culture is integrally related to the presentation of original
artworks as expressions of the social and political times.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 is a new step in increasing
visual artists' rights in their respective works, and preserving the
cultural heritage of this country, and the world. The law is a milestone,
as it demonstrates increased respect for creative individuals and their
work. Although the law contains several drawbacks, through minor
amendment, it will be capable of helping our government fulfill its
responsibility to foster, protect, and encourage the arts.
Jeff C. Schneider

229. Cf. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A(d)-(e) ("[Rlights conferred [on visual artists]... shall endure
for. .. the life of the author ... [and] those rights may be waived.").
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